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The Bab-el-Mandeb ("Gate of Grief" in Arabic) is the southern approach to the Red Sea, connecting the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea and thence via the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean. It is one of the most strategically consequential choke points in the world — approximately 30% of world container traffic between Asia and Europe transits it, along with substantial Persian Gulf crude bound for Europe and East African trade. The Strait's northern shore is Yemen (Djibouti-Ras Ali on Perim Island); the southern shore is Djibouti and Eritrea. Since November 2023, the Houthi movement based in northern Yemen has conducted a sustained missile + USV + drone campaign against merchant shipping, fundamentally reshaping Asia-Europe maritime routing.
Pre-Houthi campaign: approximately 12% of global seaborne trade by value transited annually, including ~30% of world container traffic, ~10% of world crude, and ~8% of world LNG. Daily transits: approximately 60-75 vessels through the northern approaches to the Red Sea. Major shipping lines using this route: MSC, Maersk, CMA CGM, COSCO, ONE, Evergreen, HMM, Yang Ming, ZIM (until October 2023).
Beginning 19 November 2023 with the seizure of MV Galaxy Leader, the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) initiated a sustained anti-shipping campaign framed as solidarity with Palestinian civilians during the Gaza war. Attack methods evolved through the campaign: initial ballistic missile and drone attacks against "Israel- linked" vessels; subsequent expansion to any US/UK-linked tonnage; then broader interpretation targeting Russian-origin oil and general Israel-adjacent shipping.
Attack platform mix (2023-24): anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) launched from Yemen — the first documented use of ASBMs against merchant ships in history; anti-ship cruise missiles; loitering-munition drones; water-borne uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs — explosive-laden small craft); helicopter-borne boarding parties (Galaxy Leader). Notable losses: MV True Confidence (3 crew killed), MV Tutor (1 killed, vessel sunk), MV Rubymar (sank), MV Verbena (abandoned + likely sunk). See /piracy-incidents for individual case entries.
By January 2024, Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, Yang Ming, ONE, and ZIM had all announced full or substantial suspension of Red Sea transits. Container ships rerouted via the Cape of Good Hope adding ~10 days + ~8,000 nm to the Asia-Europe transit. Tanker fleet was slower to divert (product tankers continued at higher rates than container ships), but crude tanker volumes also fell substantially by mid-2024. Chinese-flag and Russian-flag vessels continued at higher rates than Western-linked tonnage, reflecting Houthi targeting preferences.
Practical impact on the world fleet: approximately 70-80% of pre-campaign container capacity rerouted via Cape at the campaign's peak; total 2024 Red Sea transits fell by an estimated 60-70% vs 2022 baseline. Container spot rates on Asia-Europe surged from ~$1,500/TEU to peaks over $8,000/TEU by Q1 2024. The campaign is the largest single shipping-market shock since the 2020-21 COVID container crunch.
JWC listed the southern Red Sea + Bab-el-Mandeb as high-risk from December 2023. Additional-premium (AP) rates on hull & machinery war-risk cover spiked from 0.05% pre-campaign to 0.7-1.0% at the campaign's peak (Q1 2024) — a 10-20× increase. As of 2025, AP rates have moderated to ~0.3-0.5% as fleet volumes stabilised at reduced levels. Cargo war-risk cover is separately quoted, typically 0.05-0.15% of cargo CIF value for high-risk transits.
Direct comparison: pre-2023 typical AP for Bab-el-Mandeb transit was ~0.02% of hull value; a 300,000 DWT VLCC valued at $100M would pay ~$20,000 in war-risk AP. At peak 2024 rates (~0.8%), the same VLCC would pay ~$800,000 per transit — a ~40× increase, comparable to a Suez Canal toll.
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