Maritime OT vs IT security

Operational Technology (OT) — the physical control layer

OT systems physically control the vessel. If OT fails or is compromised, the vessel loses navigational or mechanical control.

• ECDIS + integrated bridge — Electronic Chart Display and Information System + radar overlay + AIS + heading gyro. Navigational safety critical.
• VDR — Voyage Data Recorder. Legally significant on casualty investigation.
• Engine + alarm monitoring — engine control room (ECR) + IAS (Integrated Alarm System) + Kongsberg/Wärtsilä/MAN control panels.
• Cargo control — tanker CCR + gas-carrier cargo system + container-lashing computers.
• Ballast water management — treatment system control.
• DP + steering — dynamic positioning + auto-pilot + steering gear.

Information Technology (IT) — the crew + business layer

IT systems support the crew and business functions. Compromise is inconvenient but doesn't (typically) put the vessel physically at risk.

• Crew WiFi + welfare — Starlink + Inmarsat crew allowance networks.
• Business email — Master + officers + ship-management-side communication.
• Cargo planning + reporting — noon-report software, cargo manifest systems.
• Crew payroll + accounting — shipboard financial software.
• Maintenance management — planned maintenance systems (AMOS, ShipSure, etc.).

The segmentation principle

The core cyber-security control is physical + logical segmentationbetween OT and IT networks. A compromised crew laptop on the WiFi network should not be able to reach the ECDIS network. This is enforced via:

• Physically separate cable runs + switches.
• DMZ (demilitarised zone) firewall between OT and IT with strict allow-list.
• USB port control on OT equipment (ECDIS updates must go through a controlled process, not a crew USB stick).
• Vendor-remote-support access via jump-host + logged sessions only.

IACS UR E26 + E27 (mandatory from 1 July 2024)

IACS Unified Requirement E26 (Cyber resilience of ships) + E27 (Cyber resilience of onboard systems and equipment) are mandatory for new-build contracts signed on or after 1 July 2024. Practical implications:

• UR E26 (ship-level): requires cyber-security type approval at class survey, including OT/IT segmentation architecture, incident response plan, and vendor security assurance.
• UR E27 (equipment-level): requires cyber-security capability declarations from every OT system supplier (ECDIS vendor, engine-control vendor, etc.). Vendors publish CBOM (Cyber Bill of Materials) to enable ship-level integration assessment.
• Retrofit implications: existing vessels not immediately affected but charterer + insurer expectations converging on E26/E27 standard by 2028-2030.

Chief Officer + ETO practical checklist

• Know which network you're on. Never plug a personal USB stick into an ECDIS or engine-alarm computer.
• ECDIS chart updates: use only vendor-approved distribution channels + verify the update signature.
• Vendor remote-access requests: require documented change-control + Master approval.
• Report any unusual behaviour (unexpected reboots, alarm-network noise, unauthorised access attempts) to the Company Security Officer.
• Cyber-incident drills should include: ECDIS failure procedure, VDR chain-of-custody, and rollback to paper charts.