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2015-10-01 · Bahamas, near Crooked Island, Atlantic · Container / ro-ro (con-ro) · United States flag
The 40-year-old US-flagged con-ro El Faro sailed from Jacksonville for San Juan on 29 September 2015 as Hurricane Joaquin intensified in the Bahamas. Captain Michael Davidson chose a direct Old Bahama Channel routing rather than the safer Providence Channels route to the north, believing his forecast information showed the hurricane tracking further north than it actually was. As the storm's projected track shifted overnight, El Faro found herself with a Category-4 hurricane bearing down on her position. She lost propulsion on 1 October at 07:15 UTC, was unable to steer through the eyewall, and sank at 07:39. All 33 aboard — 28 US Merchant Marine, 5 Polish shore contractors — died. The wreck was located 4,590m below sea level; the voyage data recorder was recovered in 2016 and its 26-hour transcript revealed Davidson's real-time reassurances to his officers and crew that the vessel would 'get to the south side of it' up until the moment of loss.
El Faro is the modern case study on tropical-cyclone-routing decision-making. The VDR transcript — the officers' progressively-more-alarmed weather queries met with Davidson's rejection of their concerns — is required listening in every US STCW meteorology module. The case established that a subordinate officer's expression of weather concern must be documented in the deck log, and refused only with justification. Also drove the professional-culture shift toward crowd-sourced weather-verification (multiple ECDIS overlays, satellite imagery, buoy data) rather than sole-master judgment.
USCG-NTSB investigation cited master's failure to divert around Hurricane Joaquin. Drove revision of the USCG's weather-routing guidance + IMO's MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.11 on heavy-weather routing. Established precedent that a modern hurricane forecast constitutes actionable knowledge under the negligence standard.